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We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties — the Proposer
and the Responder — who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time.
In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the underlying
investment and termination risk. When the project ends they consume their final accumulated wealth.
The Proposer and the Responder have constant UHODWLYH risk aversion 5 and U respectively, with 5>U>0.
We show that the optimal contract has three components: a non-contingent flow payment, a share
in investment risk and a termination payment. We derive approximations for the optimal share in
investmentrisk and the optimal termination payment, and we use numerical simulations to show that
these approximationsoffer a close fit to the exact rules. The approximations take the form of amyopic
benchmark plus adynamic correction. In the case of the approximation for the optimal share in
investmentrisk, the myopicbenchmark is simply the classical formula for optimal risk sharing. This
benchmark is endogenousbecause it depends on the wealths of the two parties. The dynamic correction
is driven by counterpartyrisk. If both parties are fairly risk tolerant, in the sense that 2>5>U, then the
Proposer takes on morerisk than she would under the myopic benchmark. If both parties are fairly
risk averse, in the sensethat 5>U>2, then the Proposer takes on less risk than she would under the
myopic benchmark. In themixed case, in which 5>2>U, the Proposer takes on more risk when the
Responder's share in total wealthis low and less risk when the Responder's share in total wealth is
high. In the case of the approximationfor the optimal termination payment, the myopic benchmark
is zero. The dynamic correction tellsus, among other things, that: (i) if the asset has a high return
then, following termination, the Respondercompensates the Proposer for the loss of a valuable
investment opportunity; and (ii) if the asset hasa low return then, prior to termination, the Responder
compensates the Proposer for the low returnsobtained. Finally, we exploit our representation of
theoptimal contract to derive simple and easilyLQWHUSUHWDEOHVXIILFLHQWFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHH[LVWHQFH
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1. Introduction
This paper considers a risk-sharing problem in which two investors pool their resources to
invest in a common risky venture. Investment returns are assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion, and the investors’ risk preferences are represented by utility functions
exhibiting constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA). The two investors have diﬀerent coef-
ﬁcients of relative risk-aversion and diﬀerent initial wealth endowments. They can write
a long-term insurance contract specifying a division of ﬁnal output contingent on the
sample path of output of the venture. The venture may end at any time with positive
probability, and when it ends the two investors consume their ﬁnal accumulated wealth.
To keep the analysis tractable we have stripped out of the model many features which
would make it more realistic. For example, our model allows for only two investors, only
one risky asset, and investors only consume at the end. In addition, we simplify the for-
mulation of the optimal contracting problem by letting one individual, the Proposer, make
a take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀer to the other, the Responder. Even so, the analysis of
this optimal contracting problem is suﬃciently complex that we are only able to approx-
imate the optimal risk-sharing rule. For reasonable parameter conﬁgurations, however,
this approximation is a good ﬁt for the numerically determined optimal risk-sharing rule.
Optimal risk-sharing between two parties was ﬁrst analyzed by Borch (1962), in the
context of a reinsurance problem. He considers an optimal contract to share risk between
an insurance and a reinsurance company (or between two insurance companies). While
his framework is more general in many respects than the one we have just described,
he only derives a necessary condition for optimal co-insurance between two risk-averse
investors, the well known Borch condition.
In this paper we push the analysis further and derive explicit risk-sharing formulae that
approximate the optimal risk-sharing rule. We do this by reformulating the risk-sharing
problem as a recursive problem in which the Proposer oﬀers the Responder spot contracts,
each of which has three components: (i) a ﬁxed transfer f to the Responder; (ii) a share s
of spot investment returns; and (iii) a ﬁnal transfer b to be paid to the Responder in the
event that the venture terminates. We then derive relatively simple formulae for s and
b that approximate the optimal risk-sharing spot contract. Thus, a central contribution
of this paper is to derive (approximate) formulae for optimal risk-sharing for the CRRA
case.
As each investor’s aversion to risk and capacity to insure the other investor varies withThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 3
its wealth, the optimal shares s and b vary with the underlying wealth distribution. Thus,
one advantage of our recursive formulation is that it brings out explicitly the underlying
dynamics of the risk-sharing problem. These dynamics can be understood as follows.
Whenever the two investors engage in risk-sharing, the optimal spot contract will specify
a division of total investment returns that is diﬀerent from each investor’s share in total
wealth. As a result, the wealth distribution in the next period will be diﬀerent from the
wealth distribution in this period. For example, if the Responder insures the Proposer, by
taking on a share of risk bigger than his share in wealth, then his wealth share will increase
when there is a high investment return and decrease when there is a low investment return.
Either way, the wealth distribution changes and consequently each investor’s attitude
towards risk and capacity to insure changes. This change in each investor’s capacity to
insure introduces endogenous counterparty risk, and forward-looking investors will take
this risk into account in deciding on the optimal spot contract.1
To gain insight into how this counterparty risk can aﬀect optimal risk-sharing, consider
the extreme case in which the Responder is risk-neutral and the Proposer is risk-averse.
It is well known that optimal risk-sharing in a one-shot insurance contracting problem in
this case requires that the Responder insure the Proposer perfectly. But if the Responder
were to do this repeatedly, then he would be sure to go bankrupt at some point, and
then the Proposer would no longer be able to get any insurance at all. Foreseeing this,
the Proposer would want to hold back from getting perfect insurance. Only when the
Responder is relatively wealthy would the Proposer seek perfect insurance. When the
Responder is relatively poor, the Proposer may optimally limit the amount of insurance
she gets to preserve future insurance opportunities.
We are able to extend this insight to the general case, in which both investors are risk
averse, by assuming that both the Proposer and the Responder are close to myopic, and
by taking approximations around the myopic optimum. This approximation therefore
takes the form of a myopic benchmark plus a dynamic correction.
Consider ﬁrst the optimal rule for the sharing of investment risk, namely s.T h e
myopic benchmark for s requires that the Responder take on a share in total investment
risk equal to the well known ratio of the Proposer’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion
1The role played by counterparty risk in our model is analogous to the role that it plays in futures
markets. There, traders are required to maintain margin accounts as a way of eliminating default.
Although these requirements prevent any default as such, they bear witness to the profound role played
by counterparty risk, and they constrain the amount of hedging a counterparty can oﬀer.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 4
to the sum of both investors’ coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion. As for the dynamic
correction, if we denote by R and r the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion of the Proposer
and Responder respectively, then:
1. When both investors are fairly risk tolerant, in the sense that R,r < 2,i ti so p t i -
mal for the less risk-averse investor to take on less risk in the dynamic-contracting
problem than the myopic rule would specify. This is because the less risk averse
investor is willing to take on risk on relatively unfavourable terms, so transferring
more risk to that investor tends to reduce the stock of insurance available to the
more risk averse investor in the future.
2. When both investors are fairly risk averse, in the sense that R,r > 2,i ti so p t i m a l
for the less risk-averse investor to take on more risk in the dynamic-contracting
problem than the myopic rule would specify. This is because the less risk averse
investor is only willing to take on risk on relatively favourable terms, so transferring
more risk to that investor tends to increase the stock of insurance available to the
more risk averse investor in the future.
3. When one investor (say the Responder) is fairly risk tolerant but the other investor
(say the Proposer) is fairly risk averse, in other words when R>2 >r , then the
Proposer takes on less risk when she is relatively poor and more risk when she is
relatively wealthy. This is because, when she is poor, her aversion to bearing risk
outweighs her concern that the Responder may run out of money; but when she is
rich, the opposite is true.
Consider next the optimal termination payment b. The myopic benchmark for b is
z e r o .T h i si sb e c a u s et h e r ei sn ot e r m i n a t i o nr i s ki nt h em y o p i cl i m i t .A sf o rt h ed y n a m i c
correction, we show that: (i) if the venture has a high return then, following termination,
the less risk averse investor compensates the more risk averse investor for the loss of a
valuable investment opportunity; and (ii) if the venture has a low return then, prior to
termination, the less risk averse investor compensates the more risk averse investor for
the low returns obtained.
Although our model is highly stylized, it may be relevant to a number of applications.
We have already mentioned reinsurance as one application. Insurance companies are obvi-
ously capital constrained and they rely on each other to share common risk. Our analysisThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 5
sheds light on how these companies should structure their risk sharing to take account of
counterparty risk. Another application, which was our initial motivation, is to portfolio-
or fund-management contracts. In practice, the contract between a representative client
and a fund manager often takes the simple form of a share of portfolio returns for the
client equal to the client’s share of investments in the fund minus a management fee,
which is equal to a small percentage of the funds under management. We recognize that
the main concern in portfolio management generally is the manager’s incentive to run
the fund in the client’s best interest. Still, we believe that our analysis may be relevant
if there are also dynamic risk-sharing considerations involved in the long-term relation
between the client and the manager.2
Besides Borch (1962) and the large literature on optimal risk sharing that it has
spawned (see Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 2005) our paper is most closely related
to the dynamic asset pricing problem with two classes of investors considered by Dumas
(1989). He analyzes the equilibrium investment and consumption choices of two classes
of investor with diﬀerent coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion in an otherwise standard
competitive economy with aggregate shocks. Although Dumas mainly focuses on equi-
librium asset pricing, his analysis proceeds via a planning problem. One key diﬀerence
between his setup and ours is that he allows for ongoing consumption, while we only have
consumption upon termination. Another is that we have termination risk, while he only
considers an inﬁnitely lived economy. Finally, Dumas’ solution method only works in the
case in which one investor has a log utility function.
There is by now accumulating evidence that consumers diﬀer substantially in their risk
preferences. Indeed, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), in their experimental
study on risk-taking decisions, found that the behaviour of 5% of subjects was consistent
with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 33 or higher, that the behaviour of another 5%
was consistent with a coeﬃcient of 1.3 or lower, and that the median coeﬃcient was about
7. Similarly, Guiso and Paiella (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2008) among others
ﬁnd evidence of heterogeneous risk preferences in households’ actual portfolio allocations.
In addition, using panel data on individual portfolio allocations between risky and riskless
assets, Chiappori and Paiella (2008) are able to determine that the elasticity of the risky-
asset share with respect to wealth in their sample is small and statistically insigniﬁcant,
which is consistent with CRRA risk preferences. In another panel study on household
2For continuous-time models of portfolio-mangement contracts with moral-hazard and/or asymmetric
information see Ou-Yang (2003), Cvitanic and Zhang (2007) and Cvitanic, Wan, and Zhang (2008).The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 6
portfolio choices, however, Paravisini, Rappoport and Ravina (2009) use investor ﬁxed
eﬀects and ﬁnd that the within-household elasticity of risk taking with respect to changes
in household wealth is negative and quite large. They also ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity
in relative risk aversion in their sample, with an average coeﬃc i e n to f2 . 8 5a n dam e d i a n
coeﬃcient of 1.62.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two investors’ prefer-
ences and the investment technology. Section 3 derives the value function of the Responder
under autarky. Section 4 formulates the long-run contracting problem between the Pro-
poser and Responder. Section 5 formulates the spot-contracting problem, and Section 6
derives the associated Bellman equation of the Proposer. Section 7 establishes that any
long-run contract for which the participation constraint of the Responder binds can be
replicated by a ﬂow of spot contracts for which the spot participation constraint of the
Responder likewise binds. Section 8 shows that the Bellman equation of the Proposer un-
der spot contracting can be reduced to a partial diﬀerential equation. Section 9 provides
a ﬁrst characterization of the optimal risk-sharing rule and termination payment in terms
of the value functions of the Proposer and Responder. Section 10 uses asymptotic ex-
pansions to derive risk-sharing formulae which approximate the optimal risk-sharing rule
and termination payment. Section 11 shows how the Bellman equation for the Proposer
can be further reduced to a pair of ordinary diﬀerential equations on (0,1).S e c t i o n 1 2
identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions under which a solution to these equations extends contin-
uously to [0,1]. Section 13 then solves the resulting two-point boundary-value problem
numerically. The numerical solutions show how well the formulae derived in Section 10
predict the qualitative shape of the optimal risk-sharing rule and termination payment,
suggesting that these formulae contain most of the analytical insight into optimal risk
sharing that can be obtained for our model. Section 14 oﬀers some concluding comments.
2. Preferences and Technology
The initial wealths of the Proposer and the Responder are W0,w 0 > 0.T h e r e i s a n
exogenous termination time T, which is distributed exponentially with parameter β>0.
At any time t ∈ [0,T] the parties have access to the same constant-stochastic-returns-
to-scale investment opportunity, but they cannot consume. For an investment x,t h i s
investment opportunity yields ﬂow returns
dx = x(μdt+ σd z),The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 7
where μ ∈ R, σ>0 and z is a standard Wiener process (i.e. the shock dz at time t is
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance dt and is independent of the shocks at all
earlier times). Following termination, both parties consume their accumulated wealths
WT+ and wT+.3
The risk preferences of the Proposer and the Responder are represented by the strictly
increasing and strictly concave utility functions U and u. In what follows it will sometimes
be helpful to avoid imposing speciﬁc functional forms on U and u, but we shall frequently

































will denote the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion of U and u respectively.
Remark 1. Throughout the paper, the subscript R will denote the Proposer and the
subscript r will denote the Responder.
3. Autarky for the Responder
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the Responder invests on his own. His value function
e v :( 0 ,∞) ×{ 0,1} → R for this case will provide his reservation value in the bilateral
3The notation here reﬂects the idea that WT+ and wT+ are the wealths of the two parties at the end
of period T. In what follows, these need to be distinguished from WT and wT, which are the wealths of
the two parties at the beginning of period T.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 8
contracting problems described below. It satisﬁes the Bellman equation
e v(w,χ)=
(
E[e v(w + dw,χ + dχ)] if χ =0
u(w) if χ =1
)
(1)
where: w is the accumulated wealth of the Responder; χ is an indicator taking the value
0 if the problem has not yet terminated and the value 1 i ft h ep r o b l e mh a st e r m i n a t e d ; 4




0 if the problem does not terminate
1 if the problem terminates
)
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0 + β (u(w) − v),( 2 )
where we have suppressed the dependence of v on w.
If r is constant, then equation (2) has an explicit solution. Indeed, given that wealth
follows a geometric Wiener process and that utility is CRRA, it is natural to conjecture
that v will take the form
v(w)=Cr(ρr w),
where ρr is the certainty-equivalent rate of return of the Responder under autarky. This
conjecture is correct, and leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the Responder has constant relative risk aversion. Then




4More precisely, the random function χ :[ 0 ,∞) → {0,1} is given by the formula χt =0if t ≤ T and





and βr = β −(1−r)(μ− 1
2 rσ 2) are the normalized value function








is the normalized marginal value of wealth of the Responder.
In particular, under autarky, the normalized value function of the Responder ψr is
simply the risk-adjusted rate of return μ− 1
2 rσ 2 divided by the eﬀective discount rate βr.
































































where βr = β−(1−r)(μ− 1
2 rσ 2). Dividing through by wC0










Since the marginal value of wealth and the normalized marginal value of wealth must
be positive, we see in particular that a basic requirement for our contracting problem to
make sense is that βr > 0, i.e. that:
Condition I. β>(1 − r)(μ − 1
2 rσ 2).
In other words, the rate of discounting β must exceed the rate of growth of utility
when wealth grows at the risk-adjusted rate of return μ − 1
2 rσ 2.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 10
Remark 3. When r<1, the utility function of the Responder is unbounded above. The
main point of Condition I is then to ensure that the wealth of the Responder cannot grow
too fast. When r>1, the utility function of the Responder is unbounded below, and the
main point of Condition I is to ensure that the wealth of the Responder cannot shrink
too fast.
It is also natural to assume that the analogue of Condition I for the Proposer holds,
namely:
Condition II. β>(1 − R)(μ − 1
2 Rσ 2).
4. The Long-Run-Contracting Problem
Suppose that the Proposer oﬀers the Responder a long-run contract q,a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c h
the two parties will pool their wealths until termination, after which the wealth pool will
be shared between them. More precisely: let Ω denote the set of pairs (X,T) such that
X :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) is continuous on the left,5 T ∈ [0,∞) and X is constant on (T,∞);6
and let q : Ω → R be a bounded measurable function such that 0 <q (X,T) <X T+ for
all (X,T) ∈ Ω.7 If the Responder accepts q then: the initial wealth pool will be
X0 = W0 + w0; (3)
5We assume that the timepaths of all of our variables are continuous on the left. This is a departure
from the usual convention, which is to take the timepaths of variables to be continuous on the right.
We do this because, in order to write our various Bellman equations in a compact way, it is helpful to
have W, w and χ,w h i c ha r es h o r tf o rWt, wt and χt, denote the values of the Proposer’s wealth, the
Responder’s wealth and the termination indicator at the beginning of period t; and to have W + dW,
w + dw and χ + dχ denote the values of these variables at the end of period t.
6In view of our convention that the timepaths of variables are continuous on the left, the timepath of
a variable over the stochastic interval [0,T] tells us the value of the variable at the beginning of every
period t ∈ [0,T] and – by taking limits on the right – the value of the variable at the end of every period
t ∈ [0,T). In particular, it tells us the initial value of the variable, i.e. the value at the beginning of
period 0, but not the ﬁnal value of the variable, i.e. the value at the end of period T. (If we adopted the
usual convention, namely that the timepaths of variables are continuous on the right, then the timepath
of a variable over the stochastic interval [0,T] would tell us the ﬁnal value of the variable at the end
of period T but not the initial value of the variable at the beginning of time 0.) We therefore need to
supply the ﬁnal value. We do this by requiring that the variable be deﬁned but constant on (T,∞),a n d
by interpreting the value there as the ﬁnal value. This convention has the advantage that the value at
the end of period T can – like the values at the end of any other period t ∈ [0,T) – be found by taking
the limit on the right.
7Notice that the information conveyed by the pair (X,T) consists of: T,w h i c hi st h et e r m i n a t i o n
time; the restriction of X to the interval [0,T],w h i c ht e l l su st h ev a l u eXt of X at the beginning of each
period t ∈ [0,T] and the value Xt+ of X at the end of each period t ∈ [0,T); and the value of X on
the interval (T,∞), which tells us the value XT+ of X at the end of each period T.T h eﬁnal payment
q(X,T) can depend on all this information.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 11
the wealth pool will evolve according to the equation
dX =
(
X (μdt+ σd z) if t ∈ [0,T]
0 if t ∈ (T,∞)
)
; (4)
and the ﬁnal wealths of the Proposer and the Responder will be
WT+ = XT+ − q(X,T) and wT+ = q(X,T). (5)
If the Responder rejects q then both parties will operate under autarky until termination.8
In the long-run contracting problem, the Proposer’s problem is therefore to choose q
to maximize her expected utility
E[U(WT+)] (6)
subject to the dynamics (3-5) and the participation constraint of the Responder, namely
E[u(wT+)] ≥ v(w0), (7)
where v is the value function of the Responder under autarky.
Three points should be noted. First, taken together, Conditions I and II ensure that
the expected payoﬀs of both parties are well deﬁned in the event of disagreement. Second,
the Proposer can always do at least as well in the long-run contracting problem as she






Third, the participation constraint of the Responder always binds in the long-run con-
tracting problem. For, if it did not, then the Proposer could just scale down q until the
participation constraint of the Responder did bind. This would have the eﬀect of trans-
ferring a strictly positive — albeit stochastic — amount of the ﬁnal total wealth from the
Responder to the Proposer, and would therefore make the Proposer strictly better oﬀ.
The main challenge in establishing the existence of an optimal contract is therefore
to show that the expected payoﬀ of the Proposer is bounded above. One of the many
advantages of the spot-contracting problem introduced below is that it allows us to ﬁnd
8Since X is continuous, total wealth XT+ at the end of period T is equal to total wealth XT at the
beginning of period T.W ew r i t eXT+ in the interests of notational consistency.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 12
transparent suﬃcient conditions under which this is the case.
5. The Spot-Contracting Problem
The easiest way to solve the long-run contracting problem is to show that it can be reduced
to a spot contracting problem. In a spot contracting problem, the two parties start out
with their initial wealths W0 and w0. Then, in each period t ∈ [0,T], the Proposer oﬀers
the Responder a spot contract







If the Responder accepts then he receives:
1. a non-contingent transfer (W + w)fd t , which is an up-front payment for his par-
ticipation in the risk-sharing arrangement;
2. a contingent transfer (W +w)s(μdt+σd z), which is his share in the total returns
on investment; and
3. a contingent transfer (W +w)bdχ, which is an insurance payment in the event that
he loses the investment opportunity as a result of termination.
More explicitly, if the Responder accepts, then the changes in the wealths of the Proposer
and the Responder are
dW =( W + w)( −fd t+( 1− s)(μdt+ σd z) − bdχ), (8)
dw =( W + w)( fd t+ s(μdt+ σdz)+bdχ). (9)
If the Responder rejects the spot contract, then both parties invest under autarky for the
current period, and the changes in the wealths of the Proposer and the Responder are
dW = W (μdt+ σdz), (10)
dw = w(μdt+ σd z). (11)
In each period t ∈ (T,∞), dW = dw =0 . Finally, at the end of period T,b o t hp a r t i e s
consume their accumulated stock of wealth to obtain utilities U(WT+) and u(wT+).The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 13
6. The Bellman Equation of the Proposer
In this section, we consider the case of the spot contracting problem in which the value
function of the Responder is his value function under autarky, namely e v,a n dt h es p o t
contract oﬀered by the Proposer is always accepted. As will become clear in the next
section, this is the only case that we shall need. In this case, the Bellman equation of the
Proposer can be derived as follows. Suppose that χ =0and, for any given spot contract
(f,s,b),p u t
dW
S =( W + w)( −fd t+( 1− s)(μdt+ σd z) − bdχ),
dw
S =( W + w)( fd t+ s(μdt+ σdz)+bdχ),
dW
A = W (μdt+ σdz),
dw
A = w(μdt+ σd z).
In other words, let dW S and dwS be the changes in the wealth of the Proposer and the
Responder if (f,s,b) is accepted; and let dWA and dwA be the changes in the wealth of
the Proposer and the Responder if (f,s,b) is rejected.
Further, let A(w) denote the set of (f,s,b) such that:
1. the participation constraint of the Responder, namely
E
£










2. the Bellman equation of the Responder, namely
e v(w,0) = E
£














e V (W + dW S,w+ dwS,χ+ dχ)
i
if χ =0





where e V :( 0 ,∞)2 ×{ 0,1} → R.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 14
Here inequality (12) says that the Responder weakly prefers to accept (f,s,b) rather
than proceed under autarky when his continuation utility is given by e v; equation (13)
says that e v(w,0) is the expected utility to the Responder from accepting (f,s,b) when his
continuation utility is given by e v; and equation (14) says that if χ =0then e V (W, w,χ)
is the expected utility to the Proposer from choosing the best feasible (f,s,b) when her
continuation utility is given by e V ,a n dt h a ti fχ =1then e V (W,w,χ) is simply U(W).
Notice that the Proposer can always ensure that the participation constraint of the
Responder is satisﬁed by choosing f =0 , s = w
W+w and b =0 . In other words, the
Proposer can always reproduce the autarky outcome by a suitable choice of spot contract.
Notice too that the only reason why dW A does not feature explicitly in these equations
is that e v does not depend on W.N o t i c e ﬁnally that, in the special case with which we
are concerned (namely the case in which the value function of the Responder under spot
contracting is simply his value function under autarky), the participation constraint holds
as an equality:
Lemma 4. The following three statements are equivalent:








e v(w + dwA,dχ)
¤
, i.e. the participation constraint of the
Responder holds as an equality;
3. e v(w,0) = E
£
e v(w + dwS,dχ)
¤
, i.e. the Bellman equation of the Responder holds.
Proof. We show ﬁrst that statement 3 implies statement 2. Indeed, since e v is the
value function of the Responder under autarky, we have
e v(w,0) = E
£




Combining this with statement 3 leads immediately to statement 2. We show next that
statement 2 implies statement 1. Indeed, if statement 2 holds then, a fortiori, the partic-
ipation constraint of the Responder must hold. On the other hand, combining statement
2 with equation (15) shows that the Bellman equation of the Responder is satisﬁed. That
statement 1 implies statement 3 is trivial.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 15
7. Replicating a Long-Run Contract
In this section, we show that any long-run contract for which the participation constraint
of the Responder holds as an equality can be replicated by a ﬂow of spot contracts for
which the participation constraint of the Responder again holds as an equality. More
precisely: recall that v = e v(·,0) is the value function of the Responder under autarky
prior to termination; suppose that we are given a long-run contract q : Ω → (0,∞) such
that E[u(q(X,T))] = v(w0);l e tFt denote the information available up to the beginning
of period min{t,T};9,10 and put
mt =E[u(q(X,T)) |F t ].
Then: m0 = v(w0) by choice of q; m is a martingale; and we may apply the martingale
representation theorem to show that there exist coeﬃcients η and θ such that
dm = ηd z+ θ(dχ − βd t ).
Here: dz and dχ are the innovations to information at time t; η and θ depend only on
information available at the beginning of period t; and, by subtracting βd tfrom dχ,w e
ensure that E[dm |F t ]=0 .M o r e o v e r :m is continuous on [0,T]; m may jump at T;a n d
m is constant and equal to u(q(X,T)) on (T,∞).
Next, deﬁne the certainty-equivalent wealth process c of the Responder by the formula
ct =
(
v−1(mt) if t ∈ [0,T]
u−1(mt) if t ∈ (T,∞)
)
.
In other words, let ct be the unique solution of the equation e v(ct,χ t)=mt. Then:
9Up to now we have largely suppressed the time subscipt. However, the argument given at the end of
the section makes explicit use of two diﬀerent times, namely t and t + dt, and it is therefore helpful to
make the time subsscript explicit on the four variables that are involved in that argument, namely F, m,
c and χ.
10The underlying stochastic drivers of our model are the standard Wiener process z and the exponen-
tially distributed termination time T.I f t>T , then the information available up to the beginning of
time t includes the timepath of z over the interval (T,t]. By conditioning only on information available
at the beginning of period min{t,T}, we exclude the use of this additional stochastic information.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 16














−1(mt + θ) − g(mt)
¢
dχ, (16)
where g = v−1;a n dc is constant and equal to q(X,T) on (T,∞).
Now, if we match the coeﬃcients of dt, dz and dχ in equation (9) for the dynamics
of the wealth of the Responder in the spot-contracting problem with the coeﬃcients of
dt, dz and dχ in equation (16) for the dynamics of the certainty-equivalent wealth of the
Responder in the long-run contracting problem, then we get








−1(mt + θ) − g(mt). (19)
Solving this system of linear equations for (f,s,b) yields
f =
1








u−1(mt + θ) − g(mt)
X
. (22)
In other words, q can be reproduced by the ﬂow of spot contracts given by the formulae
(20-22). Furthermore, for all t ∈ [0,∞),w eh a v e
E[e v(ct + dc,χt + dχ) |F t ]=E
£
e v(ct+dt,χ t+dt) |F t
¤
=E [ mt+dt |F t ]
=E [ mt + dm |F t ]
= mt
= e v(ct,χ t).
In other words, the Bellman equation of the Responder holds. By Lemma 4, this is equiv-
alent to saying that the Participation constraint of the Responder holds as an equality.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 17
8. The Reduced Bellman Equation
In the long-run contracting problem, the Proposer can always do better by choosing a
contract for which the participation constraint of the Responder holds as an equality.
Furthermore, any such contract can be replicated by a ﬂow of spot contracts for which
the participation constraint of the Responder again holds as an equality. The Proposer
can therefore always do at least as well in the spot-contracting problem as in the long-run
contracting problem. It is therefore of considerable interest to solve the spot-contracting
problem.
In this section, we make a start by showing that the Bellman equation of the Proposer
under spot contracting, namely equation (14), can be reduced to a partial diﬀerential
equation, namely equation (23) below. To this end: put V = e V (·,0); denote the partial
derivatives of V by VW, Vw, VWW, VWwand Vww;a n dl e tVP = VW−Vw, VWP = VWW−VWw
and VPP = VWW − 2VWw+ Vww. Then:
Proposition 5. V satisﬁes the equation








2 (W + w)
2
µ









U(W − (W + w)b) − V +
VP
v0 (u(w +( W + w)b) − v)
¶¾
. (23)
We shall refer to equation (23) as the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer. The
maximand in this equation involves three main terms. The ﬁrst term is
μ(W + w)VW. (Term 1)
In order to bring out the analogy with the other terms in the equation, it is helpful to
separate this term into two parts. The ﬁr s tp a r ti s
(1 − s)μ(W + w)VW + sμ(W + w)Vw. (Term 1a)
This is the direct beneﬁt to the Proposer of the expected return on total wealth when itThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 18
is shared according to the sharing rule s. It consists of: the Proposer’s share 1−s in the
expected return μ(W + w) times the shadow value VW to the Proposer of wealth in the
hands of the Proposer; plus the Responder’s share s in the expected return μ(W + w)
times the shadow value Vw to the Proposer of wealth in the hands of the Responder. The
second part is
sμ(W + w)VP (Term 1b)
This is the indirect beneﬁt to the Proposer of the expected return on total wealth when
it is shared according to the sharing rule s.I nt h i sp a r t :sμ(W + w) is the Responder’s
share in the expected return μ(W + w);a n dVP is the shadow value to the Proposer of
transfers from the Responder to the Proposer. Notice that: the shadow value of transfers
VP = VW − Vw takes into account both the impact of a transfer on the Proposer’s own
wealth (as measured by VW) and the impact of a transfer on the Responder’s wealth (as
measured by Vw); and the impact of a transfer on the Responder’s wealth must be taken
into account since (by making the Responder poorer) a transfer may worsen the terms on
which the Proposer can get insurance from the Responder in the future.
The second term consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part (with sign reversed) is
−1
2 σ
2 (W + w)
2 ¡




This is the direct cost to the Proposer of the investment shocks when they are shared
according to the sharing rule s. It can be written more explicitly as
−1
2 σ
2 (W + w)
2 ¡
(1 − s)




Notice that the Proposer cares about shocks to her own wealth, about shocks to the
Responder’s wealth (since these aﬀect the terms on which she can obtain insurance) and
about the correlation between the shocks to her own wealth and those to the wealth of
the Responder. The second part of the second term (with sign reversed) is
−1
2 σ





T h i si st h ei n d i r e c tc o s tt ot h eP r o p o s e ro ft h es h o c k st oW and w when they are shared
a c c o r d i n gt ot h es h a r i n gr u l es.I n t h i s p a r t :−1
2 σ2 (W + w)2 s2 v00 i st h ec o s tt ot h e
Responder of the shocks; v0 is the shadow value to the Responder of wealth in the handsThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 19
of the Responder; and VP is the shadow value to the Proposer of transfers from the
Responder to the Proposer. The cost to the Responder is initially measured in units of
the Responder’s utility. Dividing it by v0 converts it into money terms, at which point its
value to the Proposer can be found by multiplying by VP. The second part of the second
term can also be written
1
2 σ









which emphasizes the role played by the absolute risk aversion of the Responder (namely
−v00
v0 ). Notice that the absolute risk aversion of the Responder is endogenous (it depends
on w).
The third term likewise consists of two parts. The ﬁr s tp a r t( w i t hs i g nr e v e r s e d )i s
β (V − U(W − (W + w)b)). (Term 3a)
This is the direct cost to the Proposer of termination when it is insured using the payment
b. The second part of the third term (with sign reversed) is
VP
v0 β (v − u(w +( W + w)b)). (Term 3b)
This is the indirect cost to the Proposer of termination when it is insured using the
payment b.I n t h i s p a r t :β (v − u(w +( W + w)b)) is the cost to the Responder of the
possibility of termination; v0 is, as above, the shadow value to the Responder of wealth
in the hands of the Responder; and VP is, as before, the shadow value to the Proposer of
transfers from the Responder to the Proposer.
To summarize, under spot contracting, the Proposer takes into account the expected
return obtained by both parties, the costs to both parties of the shocks to wealth as
mitigated by the risk-sharing rule s and the costs to both parties of the termination risk
as mitigated by the risk-sharing rule b. The maximand of the Proposer involves three
terms: a term in μ;at e r mi nσ2;a n dat e r mi nβ.T h et e r mi nμ does not involve either
of the control variables s or b;t h et e r mi nσ2 involves only s;a n dt h et e r mi nβ involves
only b. The problem of optimizing s is therefore separable from the problem of optimizing
b.
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, (f,s,b) ∈ A(w) iﬀ equation (13) holds. Putting v = e v(·,0)The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 20











δw =( W + w)(fd t+ s(μdt+ σd z)),
∆w =( W + w)bdχ.
Hence
v = v +
³
(W + w)(f + sμ)v
0 + 1





+ β (u(w +( W + w)b) − v)
´
dt,
where we have suppressed the dependence of v and its derivatives on w,o r
(W + w)(f + sμ)=−1





u(w +( W + w)b) − v
v0 . (24)
We conclude that A(w) can be characterized as the set of (f,s,b) such that equation (24)
holds.
Next, putting V = e V (·,0) in equation (14), we obtain









2 +2VWw(W,w)δW δw + Vww(W,w)δw
2¢




δW =( W + w)(−fd t+( 1− s)(μdt+ σdz)),
∆W = −(W + w)bdχThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 21
and δw is as above. Hence





(W + w)(−f +( 1− s)μ)VW +( W + w)(f + sμ)Vw
+ 1




2 VWW +2s(1 − s)VWw+ s
2 Vww
¢





where we have suppressed the dependence of V and its derivatives on (W,w),o r
0= m a x
(f,s,b)∈A(w)
n
(W + w)μV W − (W + w)(f + sμ)(VW − Vw)+
+ 1




2 VWW +2s(1 − s)VWw+ s
2 Vww
¢
+ β (U(W − (W + w)b) − V )
o
.
Using equation (24) to substitute for (W +w)(f +sμ), taking advantage of the notation
VP, VWP and VPP and rearranging, we obtain equation (23).
9. First-Order Conditions for s and b
In this section, we give a preliminary characterization of the optimal sharing rule s and
the optimal termination payment b in terms of the value functions V and v of the Proposer
and the Responder.












Proof. Maximizing the maximand in the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer,
namely equation (23), with respect to s boils down to maximizing the quadratic
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with respect to s. Assuming that VPP +
VP







Noting that VWP = VPP + VwP and dividing through by −VP, we obtain the desired
expression.
Expression (25) for the optimal dynamic sharing rule summarizes the main economic
issues underlying our risk-sharing problem. In order to understand it better, it is helpful









Compared with this rule, the optimal dynamic rule exhibits three complications. First,
the exogenous utility functions U and u are replaced with the endogenous value functions
V and v. Second, the risk aversion of the Proposer is evaluated not with respect to her
own wealth W, but instead with respect to the diﬀerence between her own wealth and that
of the Responder, namely P = W − w.12 Third, there is an additional term −
VwP
VP in the
numerator. This term captures the idea that current changes in the Responder’s wealth
have implications for the price at which the Proposer will be able to obtain insurance in
the future.13
Proposition 7. The optimal termination payment b is the unique solution of
U0(W − (W + w)b)




Proof. Maximizing the maximand in the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer
with respect to b boils down to maximizing
U(W − (W + w)b) − V +
VP
v0 (u(w +( W + w)b) − v)
11It can be shown quite generally that VPP + v00 VP
v0 ≥ 0, and our later analysis will conﬁrm that this
inequality is strict when both parties have constant relative risk aversion.
12The risk aversion of the Responder is still evaluated with respect to his own wealth since v does not
depend on W.
13The analogous term for the Responder does not occur since v does not depend on W.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 23
with respect to b. This expression is strictly concave in b,a n dt h eﬁrst-order condition
for this maximization is
0=( W + w)
µ
−U
0(W − (W + w)b)+
VP
v0 u
0(w +( W + w)b)
¶
.
Rearranging, we obtain the desired equation.
The optimality condition (26) is akin to the familiar Borch condition. The optimal
ﬁnal transfer is set so that the ratio of the Proposer’s and the Responder’s marginal utility
of wealth in the event that termination occurs is equal to the ratio of the Proposer’s and
the Responder’s marginal value of transfers (in the event that termination does not occur).
The close analogy between this optimality condition and the Borch condition suggests that
VP and v0 can be interpreted as the welfare weights of the Proposer and the Responder
in a welfare maximization problem.
10. Asymptotic Expansions
A ﬁrst approach to understanding optimal risk sharing is to consider what happens when
β is large, i.e. when the future is heavily discounted. More precisely, we look for ap-
proximations to V , v, s and b in the form V (0) + 1
β V (1), v(0) + 1
β v(1), s(0) + 1
β s(1) and
b(0) + 1
β b(1). A striking feature of these approximations is that they give a qualitatively
accurate picture of the behaviour of V , v, s and b even when β t a k e so nm u c hm o r e
moderate values, as is demonstated by our numerical simulations in Section 13 below.
10.1. Myopic Terms. We begin by indentifying the myopic components of V , v, s
and b,n a m e l yV (0), v(0), s(0) and b(0).






and b(0) =0 .
These expressions can be explained as follows. First, at order 0, the relationship ends
immediately. The myopic value functions V (0) and v(0) are therefore simply the respective
utilities U and u of consuming current wealth. Second, the myopic sharing rule s(0) is
the familiar ratio of the Proposer’s coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion to the sum of the
two parties coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion. Third, the myopic termination payment
b(0) is zero because, when β is very large, termination is essentially certain and it is not
therefore possible to insure against it.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 24
Proof. Dividing the Bellman equation of the Responder under autarky, namely (2),
through by β and rearranging, we obtain










Hence, putting v = v(0) + 1

























Hence, equating terms of order 0,w eo b t a i nv(0) = u(w).
Second, dividing the Bellman equation of the Responder under spot contracting,
namely (24), through by β and rearranging, we obtain








00 +( W + w)(f + sμ)v
0
´
Hence, putting v = v(0) + 1
β v(1), f = f(0) + 1
β f(1), s = s(0) + 1
β s(1) and b = b(0) + 1
β b(1),
and equating terms of order 0,w eo b t a i nv(0) = u(w+(W +w)b(0)). But we have already
shown that v(0) = u(w). It follows that b(0) =0 .
Third, dividing the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer, namely (23), through
by β and rearranging, we obtain




















2 (W + w)
2
µ












Hence, putting V = V (0) + 1
βV (1), v = v(0) + 1
βv(1), s = s(0) + 1
β s(1) and b = b(0) + 1
βb(1),
bearing in mind the envelope principle (which tells us that — in calculating ﬁrst-order terms
— we need not consider ﬁrst-order variations in s and b), denoting the ﬁrst derivative ofThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 25
v(1) by v
(1)
w and rearranging, we obtain

































































































































Hence, equating terms of order 0, V (0) = U(W).
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Hence, putting V = V (0) + 1
β V (1), v = v(0) + 1
β v(1) and s = s(0) + 1
β s(1), and equating
































Finally, recalling that V (0) = U and v(0) = u, we obtain the required expression.
10.2. Dynamic Terms: V (1) and v(1). In this section we determine the dynamic
corrections V (1) and v(1) by equating the terms of order 1 in 1
β in the relevant equations.
Proposition 9. We have:
1. V (1) =
µ
(μ − 1
2 Rσ 2)W + 1
2












where we have suppressed the dependence of R and r on W and w respectively.
In other words, the dynamic correction V (1) is composed of three elements: the risk-




the monetary value of the gains from sharing investment risk, namely
1
2





and the marginal utility of wealth U0(W).T h eﬁrst two elements are measured in units
of wealth. Multiplying them by U0(W) converts them into units of the Proposer’s util-





and the marginal utility of wealth u0(w).The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 27
Notice that there is no contribution to V (1) reﬂecting the monetary value of the gains
from sharing termination risk. Such a contribution would be expected to arise at order
2. However, exploring higher-order terms in the expansions is beyond the scope of this
paper.14 Also, in accordance with the bargaining positions of the two parties, the Respon-
der does not receive any share in the gains from sharing investment risk. Finally, these
formulae do not depend on the assumption that U and u are CRRA. (The formulae for
s(1) and b(1) below do.)



























































Hence, taking advantage of the fact that V (0) = U and rearranging,
V (1)
U0 = μ(W + w)+1
2 σ







































14Such contributions do occur in Conditions III and IV in Section 12 below.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 28
and rearranging, we obtain
V (1)










10.3. Dynamic Terms: s(1). In this section we determine the dynamic correction
s(1) to the myopic sharing rule s(0). This correction is of interest for two reasons. First, it
allows us to make qualitative predictions as to how the optimal risk-sharing rule s diﬀers
from the myopic sharing rule s(0). These predictions can then be compared with numerical
simulations. Second, it oﬀers some insight into why s diﬀers from s(0) in the way that it
does.










2 Rrσ 2 y2 (1 − y)2
((1 − y)R + yr)5 (R − r)3¡
(1 − y)R + yr− 2
¢
,
where y = W
W+w is the Proposer’s share in aggregate wealth.
The main lessons that can be extracted from the formula for s(0) are as follows. First,
t h em y o p i cs h a r i n gr u l es(0) is – modulo normalization by multiplying the numerator and
the denominator by W+w – the ratio of the Proposer’s absolute risk aversion, namely R
W,
to the sum of the Proposer’s and the Responder’s absolute risk aversions, namely R
W + r
w.
It is strictly decreasing in the Proposer’s wealth share y.W h e n y =0 ,t h eP r o p o s e ri s
eﬀectively inﬁnitely risk averse, and s(0) =1 .W h e ny =1 , the Responder is eﬀectively
inﬁnitely risk averse, and s(0) =0 .
Second, notice that s(0) is the proportion of the investment risk on total wealth that
the Responder bears. The proportion of the investment risk on his own wealth that he






(1 − y)R + yr
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and his leverage is
R
(1 − y)R + yr
− 1=
y(R − r)
(1 − y)R + yr
.
If R>rthen his leverage is 0 when y =0 , and rises to R−r
r > 0 when y =1 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,
his leverage is greater when his wealth is smaller. His leverage is 0 when y =0because
in that case he has all the wealth, and so risk sharing with the Proposer has a negligible
impact. It is increasing in y because – from his point of view – the opportunities for
risk sharing are increasing in y and, as the less risk averse party, taking advantage of these
opportunites means increasing his leverage. If R<r , then his leverage is 0 when y =0
and falls to R−r
r < 0 when y =1 . In particular, his leverage is smaller when his wealth is
smaller.
Third, if R = r,t h e ns(0) =1− y and s(1) =0 . In other words, each party bears
precisely the risk on their own wealth, and their wealth shares therefore remain unchanged.
Turning to the formula for the dynamic correction s(1),w eb e g i nw i t had e ﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 11. The Proposer is fairly risk tolerant if R<2 and fairly risk averse if
R>2. Similarly, the Responder is fairly risk tolerant if r<2 and fairly risk averse if
r>2.
We go on to note that s(1) is the product of three terms, namely
1
2 Rrσ 2 y2 (1 − y)2
((1 − y)R + yr)5 , (R − r)
3, (1 − y)R + yr− 2.
The ﬁrst of these is always positive; the second has the same sign as R−r;a n dt h et h i r d
is aﬃne in y. Hence, if we assume for concreteness that R>r , then we have three cases
to consider:
The Risk-Tolerant Case When both parties are fairly risk tolerant, i.e. 2 >R>r ,
then (1 − y)R + yr− 2 < 0 for all y ∈ [0,1]. Hence s(1) < 0 for all y ∈ (0,1).
This suggests that s −s(0) < 0 for all y ∈ (0,1),w h e r es is the optimal risk-sharing
rule. In other words, irrespective of the distribution of wealth, it is optimal for the
Proposer to transfer less risk to the Responder than she would under the myopic
risk-sharing rule. The risk-tolerant case is illustrated in Figure 1(a).
The Risk-Averse Case When both parties are fairly risk averse, i.e. R>r>2,t h e n
(1−y)R+yr−2 > 0 for all y ∈ [0,1].H e n c es(1) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1). This suggestsThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 30
that s−s(0) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1). In other words, irrespective of the distribution of
wealth, it is optimal for the Proposer to transfer more risk to the Responder than
she would under the myopic risk-sharing rule. The risk-averse case is illustrated in
Figure 1(b).
The Mixed Case When the Proposer is fairly risk averse and the Responder is fairly





















. In other words, when the Proposer has a small
share in total wealth, it is optimal for her to transfer more risk to the Responder
than she would under the myopic risk sharing rule; and, when she has a large share
in total wealth, it is optimal for her to transfer less risk to him than she would
under the myopic risk sharing rule. The mixed case is illustrated in Figure 1(c).
Figure 1 about here
The qualitative accuracy of these predictions can be demonstrated by plotting s−s(0),
where s is the (numerically computed) optimal contract.15 This is done in Figure 2.
Figure 2(a) shows s − s(0) in the risk-tolerant case. This ﬁgure is very similar to Figure
1(a). The main diﬀerence is quantitative: the minimum in Figure 2(a) is somewhat lower
than that in Figure 1(a). Figure 2(b) shows s−s(0) in the risk-averse case. This ﬁgure is
very similar to Figure 1(b). The main diﬀerence is again quantitative: the maximum in
Figure 2(b) is somewhat lower than that in Figure 1(b). Finally, Figure 2(c) shows s−s(0)
in the mixed case. This ﬁgure is similar to Figure 1(c) in that the graph ﬁrst rises to a
positive maximum and then falls to a negative minimum. However, the balance between
the left-hand hump and the right-hand hump is slightly diﬀerent.
Figure 2 about here
The predictions are best understood in terms of counterparty risk. Indeed, consider
the risk-tolerant case. Since r<2, the Responder is willing to take on risk on relatively
unfavourable terms, and the Proposer must bear in mind the possibility that he will
eventually run out of wealth. This leads her to take on somewhat more risk than she
15See Section 13 below for more information on the numerically computed optimal contract.Figure 1: the dynamic correction
1
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Figure 1HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case Hwith R = 1, r = 0.5, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L








Figure 1HbL: the Risk-Averse Case Hwith R = 10, r = 2.5, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L





Figure 1HcL: the Mixed Case Hwith R = 8, r = 1.3, s = 0.15, b = 0.05LFigure 2: s - sH0L, for comparison with
1
b sH1L







Figure 2HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case Hwith R = 1, r = 0.5, m = 0.025, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L








Figure 2HbL: the Risk-Averse Case Hwith R = 10, r = 2.5, m = 0.12, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L





Figure 2HcL: the Mixed Case Hwith R = 8, r = 1.3, m = 0.10, s = 0.15, b = 0.05LThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 31
would under the myopic benchmark, thereby delaying the time at which the Responder
runs out of wealth. In eﬀect, insurance is a scarce resource, and she chooses to husband it.
Now consider the mixed case. The Responder is still willing to take on risk on relatively
unfavourable terms, and the Proposer must still bear in mind the possibility that he
will eventually run out of wealth. However, in this case the Proposer is only willing to
take on the extra risk when she has a fairly large wealth share, i.e. when y>R−2
R−r.
When y<R−2
R−r, the cost of bearing additional risk outweighs the beneﬁt of husbanding
insurance, and she transfers more risk to the Responder than she would under the myopic
benchmark. Loosely speaking, the stock of insurance is measured by 1−y,a n ds h o u l db e
exploited when y<R−2
R−r and conserved when y>R−2
R−r. Finally, consider the risk-averse
case. Since r>2, the Responder is only willing to take on risk on relatively favourable
terms. Transferring more risk to him therefore has the indirect eﬀect of increasing the rate
of growth of his wealth and therefore the stock of insurance. The Proposer therefore does
not hesitate to transfer more risk to him than she would under the myopic benchmark.
Proof of Proposition 10. Put A = −
VPP
VP , a = −
v00
v0 and θ = −
VwP






W,A (1) = − R
W2 G + R
W GP − GPP,
a(0) = r













Hence, using the fact that θ
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Now, using the formulae for A(0), A(1), θ
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2 Rrσ 2 y2 (1 − y)2 (R − r)3 ((1 − y)R + yr− 2)
((1 − y)R + yr)5 ,
as required.
10.4. Dynamic Terms: b(1). In this section we determine the dynamic correction b(1)
t ot h em y o p i ct e r m i n a t i o np a y m e n tb(0).S i n c eb(0) =0 , this correction leads directly to
qualitative predictions about the optimal termination payment b. The principal prediction
is that the sign of b will depend on whether the investment opportunity is good or bad,
in the sense that the ratio
2μ
σ2 is high or low relative to the other parameters of the model.
For example, suppose that R>r . In this case, if the value of the investment opportunity
is high, then we should have b<0. In other words, the Responder should compensate the
Proposer for the loss of the valuable investment opportunity when termination occurs.
On the other hand, if the value of the investment opportunity is low, then we should
have b>0. In other words, the Responder should compensate the Proposer for the losses
that she faces while the investment is ongoing, and receives in return a payment from the
Proposer when the good state (namely termination) is reached.
There is, however, an important twist to the story: for intermediate values of the ratio
2μ
σ2, the sign of b should depend on the Proposer’s wealth share y. In the risk-tolerant case,
we predict that b will be positive for small y and negative for large y.I nt h er i s k - a v e r s e
case, we predict that b will be negative for small y and positive for large y.I nt h em i x e d
case, the picture is more involved. However, the most interesting possibility is that inThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 33
which b will be negative for y near 0 or 1 but positive for intermediate values of y.














(R − r)2 y2 − 3R(R − r)y + R(2R − 1)
((1 − y)R + yr)2
and y = W
W+w is the Proposer’s share in aggregate wealth.
Now, b(1) is the product of three terms, namely
y(1 − y)
(1 − y)R + yr
,R − r, 1
2 σ
2 B(y) − μ.
The ﬁrst of these is always positive; the second has the same sign as R−r;a n dt h et h i r d
is linear in the core parameters μ and σ2, but depends in an apparently complicated way
on y. Fortunately, this complexity is more apparent than real: if we diﬀerentiate B with





((1 − y)R + yr)3((1 − y)R + yr− 2).
Assuming for concreteness that R>r , we therefore arrive at the three same cases that
we encountered in the context of our discussion of s(1),n a m e l y :
The Risk-Tolerant Case If 2 >R>r ,t h e nw eh a v eB0 < 0 for all y ∈ [0,1].T h e r e







In the ﬁrst subcase, b(1) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1); in the second, there exists y ∈ (0,1)
such that b(1) > 0 for y ∈ (0,y) and b(1) < 0 for y ∈ (y,1); in the third, b(1) < 0 for
all y ∈ (0,1). This case is illustrated in Figure 3(a).The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 34
The Risk-Averse Case If R>r>2,t h e nw eh a v eB0 > 0 for all y ∈ [0,1].T h e r ea r e







In the ﬁrst subcase, b(1) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1); in the second, there exists y ∈ (0,1)
such that b(1) < 0 for y ∈ (0,y) and b(1) > 0 for y ∈ (y,1); in the third, b(1) < 0 for
all y ∈ (0,1).T h i sc a s ei si l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e3 ( b ) .










.P u t t i n g
B =m a x {B(y) | y ∈ [0,1]} = 1
4 r(4 + R),













This case is illustrated in Figure 3(c).16
Figure 3 about here
Since b(0) =0 , these observations concerning b(1) translate directly into predictions
about the optimal termination payment b. These predictions are remarkable at three
levels. First, they are qualitatively correct: every case and subcase described above
occurs. Second, they are quantitatively correct in the sense that they even predict the
parameter values for which the various cases will occur. For example, if we are looking for
the third subcase of the mixed case, which involves b(1) < 0 near the ends of the interval















16The second subcase of the mixed case divides into two subsubcases depending on whether B(0) <B (1)
or B(0) >B (1). In this connection, it is worth noting that B(0) <B (1) iﬀ t h eh a r m o n i cm e a no fR
and r exceeds 2. This is another instance where the outcome depends on whether mean risk aversion lies
above or below 2.Figure 3: the function B






Figure 3HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case Hwith R = 1, r = 0.5L









Figure 3HbL: the Risk-Averse Case Hwith R = 10, r = 2.5L









Figure 3HcL: the Mixed Case Hwith R = 8, r = 1.3LThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 35
Third, they are correct for values of β as low as 0.05, even though the expansions are
theoretically valid only for large β.17
Proof of Proposition 12. The ﬁrst-order condition for b, namely (26), takes the
form
U0(W − (W + w)b)











































I =( μ − 1
2 Rσ
2)W, i =( μ − 1
2rσ
2)w and G = 1
2




denote the investment return of the Proposer, the investment return of the Responder




























(I + G) − W










In other words, when termination occurs: the Responder pays the Proposer a fraction
s(0) of the total loss I + G to the Proposer from termination; and the Proposer pays
the Responder a fraction 1 − s(0) of the total loss i to the Responder from termination.
These payments are, however, oﬀset by terms reﬂecting the opportunity cost of buying
the termination insurance ex ante. Finally, substituting for I, i and G and collecting
17The three parameters β, μ and σ2 are not independent of one another: one of them can be scaled
out of the problem. For the present purposes, it is convenient to scale out σ2. In this way we arrive at
the dimensionless parameter ε = σ2
β . Our asymptotic expansions are premised on the assumption that
this parameter is small. In all of the three baseline parameter constellations used in Section 13 below,
we have σ2 =0 .0225 and therefore ε =0 .45. This is still less than 1, and cannot therefore be considered
to be exceptionally large.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 36
terms in μ and σ2 yields the required formula for b(1).
11. The One-dimensional Bellman Equation
Asymptotic expansions in 1
β have yielded approximations for the optimal risk-sharing rule
and the optimal termination payment when β is large. Do these approximations tell us
most of what we want to know about the general case, or do new phenomena arise when β
is not necessarily large? To answer this question, we need to compute numerical solutions
for the Bellman equation and the optimal contract, and to compare these solutions with
the approximations. In this section we undertake some of the preparatory analytical work
that is needed before we can turn to the numerical simulations themselves. This involves
t w om a i ns t e p s :( i )w er e d u c et h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o nf r o map a r t i a ld i ﬀerential equation in
(W,w)- s p a c et oap a i ro fo r d i n a r yd i ﬀerential equations in y-space; (ii) we normalize the
value function with respect to the wealth share of both the Proposer and the Responder.
In the process, we arrive at some new analytical insights. For example, we obtain a proof
of the intuitively reasonable result that the Responder takes on more that his share in
the total investment risk when r<R , and less than his share when r>R .18 Or again,
we obtain a much more concrete formula for s.19 Nonetheless, the reader who is anxious
to see the numerical results – and how they compare with the approximations – may
wish to skip the remainder of this section, review Conditions III and IV in Section 12,
and then proceed to Section 13.
11.1. Some Normalizations. Since both the Proposer and the Responder have CRRA
utility, and since the returns to their investment follow a geometric Brownian motion, it
is natural to look for a solution to the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer in the
form
V (W,w)=CR(ρ(y)W),
where ρ is the Proposer’s certainty-equivalent rate of return and y = W
W+w is the Proposer’s




18See Corollary 17 below.
19Compare equation (25) above, which gives the formula for the general case in which U and u are
not necessarily CRRA, with equation (39) below, which gives the formula obtained in the special case in
which U and u are CRRA.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 37
and it turns out to be more convenient to work in terms of
ψ(y)=CR(ρ(y)),







is what we call the normalized marginal value of transfers of the Proposer.
We take the following proposition to be economically obvious:
Proposition 13. γ>0. ¥
Next, we shall need an appropriate normalization of ψ. To this end, we consider
the Proposer’s problem under autarky. By analogy with the Responder’s problem under
autarky, we see at once that the Proposer’s value function under autarky takes the form
CR(W)+WC 0






βR = β − (1 − R)(μ − 1
2 Rσ
2).
Moreover her marginal value of wealth under autarky takes the form γR C0










The motivation for looking at the diﬀerence ψ(y) − ψR should be clear: we want to see
what the Proposer gains by sharing risk with the Responder. The motivation for dividing
through by 1 − y is that the gain from trade is necessarily small when y is near 0 or 1,
and we would like to measure the gain from trade relative to the wealth of the poorerThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 38
of the two parties. Now, the initial normalization that we made in moving from V to ψ
took care of the possibility that the Proposer might have little wealth. So it remains only
to take care of the possibility that the Responder might have little wealth. This explains
the presence of the factor 1 − y in the denominator. The factor γR serves to simplify the
algebra which follows.
It is also convenient to introduce analogous normalizations for the contracting variables
s and b,n a m e l y
z =






From an economic perspective, z is simply the ratio of the Responder’s leverage to the
Principal’s share in total wealth. Indeed, the total investment risk borne by the Responder
is s(W + w),a n dh i sl e v e r a g ei st h e r e f o r e
s(W + w) − w
w
=
s − (1 − y)
1 − y
.
From a mathematical perspective, notice that the Responder takes on a share in the total
investment risk diﬀerent from his autarky share, namely 1 − y.T h i s d i ﬀerence will be
small when y is near 0, since then the Responder has to bear almost all the risk (because
he owns almost all the wealth). It will also be small when y is near 1, since then the
Responder bears almost none of the risk (bec a u s eh eo w n sa l m o s tn o n eo ft h ew e a l t h ) .
Dividing through by y(1−y) therefore normalizes the departure of the Responder’s share
under bilateral contracting from his share under autarky. Similarly, the proportion b of
total wealth transferred between the two parties in the event of termination is small when
y is near 0 or 1. It is therefore helpful to normalize b so that it is measured relative to
the Proposer’s wealth when y is near 0 and the Responder’s wealth when y is near 1.




U(W − (W + w)b) − V +
VP
v0 (u(w +( W + w)b) − v)
¶
in the reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer (namely (23)). Taking advantage of the
fact that V = CR(ρW), v = Cr(ρr w), VP = γC 0
R(W) and v0 = γr C0
r(w),t h i st e r mc a n
be rewritten in the form
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where the function Φ is deﬁned in two steps. The ﬁrst step is to put
Φ(g,y,γ)=







for all (y,γ) ∈ (0,1) × (0,∞) and all g ∈ (−y−1,(1 − y)−1). However, since CR(1) =
Cr(1) = 0 and C0
R(1) = C0
r(1) = 1, Φ extends continuously to include the case (g,y,γ) ∈










We shall also need the function φ given by the formula
φ(y,γ)= m a x
g∈(−y−1,(1−y)−1)
{Φ(g,y,γ)}.
for all (y,γ) ∈ (0,1) × (0,∞),a n db yt h ef o r m u l a e
φ(0,γ)= m a x
g∈(−∞,1)
{Φ(g,0,γ)} and φ(1,γ)= m a x
g∈(−1,∞)
{Φ(g,0,γ)}
for all γ ∈ (0,∞).
We shall refer to χ as the normalized gain from trade and to φ as the normalized gain
from sharing termination risk. Also, since the overall gain from trade is made up of the
gain from sharing termination risk and the gain from sharing investment risk, we refer to
χ − φ as the normalized gain from sharing investment risk.
11.2. A Pair of One-Dimensional Equations. We are now in a position to take the
ﬁrst major step in the derivation of the one-dimensional version of the reduced Bellman
equation of the Proposer:
Proposition 14. The reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer, namely equation (23),The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 40
can be written equivalently as a pair of one-dimensional equations for γ and χ,n a m e l y




γσ 2 (Φ(g,y,γ) − χ)
+( R − r)z − 1
2
µ













− ((1 − R) − (2 − R)y)χ, (30)
where we have suppressed the dependence of γ and χ on y.
Notice that choosing g reduces to maximizing Φ(g,y,γ) with respect to g,a n dt h a t
choosing z reduces to maximizing
(R − r)z − 1
2
µ






with respect to z. Also, the maximand (31) for z involves two terms: a linear incentive
and a quadratic penalty. The linear incentive is simply R−r: the more the risk aversion
of the Proposer exceeds that of the Responder, the greater will be the Responder’s nor-
malized leverage z. The quadratic penalty is (the multiplicative factor W+w
Ww aside) total
endogenous risk aversion.20 It is this which puts a brake on leverage.
20The endogenous absolute risk aversion of the Proposer is −VPP
VP and the endogenous absolute risk
aversion of the Responder is −v00















Cf. Section 11.3 below. Proposition 15 below shows that this is strictly positive.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 41
Proof. Elementary calculations show that











































































































(1 − y)(Cr(1 + yg) − ψr).
Substituting into equation (23), dividing through by (W + w)C0
R(W), taking advantage
of the notation Φ, putting s =( 1− y)(1+yz), collecting terms in β, z and z2, dividing
through by γσ 2 y(1−y) and rearranging therefore yields equation (29). Finally, we have
γ =1+( 1− R)ψ + yψ
0
and
ψ = ψR +( 1− y)γR χ.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 42
Diﬀerentiating the latter equation to get ψ
0 in terms of χ0, substituting in the former
equation and rearranging, we obtain equation (30).
Next we establish that total endogenous risk aversion, and therefore the quadratic
penalty on leverage, is strictly positive. The proof proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step
shows that total endogenous risk aversion must be non-negative, because otherwise the
two parties would use the Wiener noise to construct bets, and thus arbitrage away the
inﬁnite gains from trade implicit in strictly negative total risk aversion.
Proposition 15. Suppose that R 6= r.T h e n(1 − y)R + yr−
y (1−y)γ0
γ > 0.
Proof. Since the maximand in equation (29) is additively separable in g and z,






γσ 2 (χ − φ)+( R − r)z − 1
2
µ








However, as it stands, this equation is not fully precise: z can take any real value, and
therefore the coeﬃcients of the equation are unbounded. To obtain a precise version of







γσ 2 (χ − φ)
1
























21Note that the normalization should in principle be applied consistently throughout the paper. How-
ever, we have suppressed it for expositional convenience. We make it explicit here since this is the one
place where it plays an important role.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 43
It therefore remains only to show that this inequality cannot hold as an equality. Suppose
for a contradiction that (1 − y)R + yr−
y (1−y)γ0






γσ 2 (χ − φ)+( R − r)z
¶
≤ 0
for all z ∈ R.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e R 6= r, the expression in parentheses is a non-constant
aﬃne function of z. It must therefore be strictly positive for some choice of z.T h i si st h e
required contradiction.
Proposition 16. The reduced Bellman equation of the Proposer, namely equation (23),




(1 − y)R + yr−
1
2 (R − r)2 σ2 γ








− ((1 − R) − (2 − R)y)χ. (34)
Moreover the optimal risk-sharing rule takes the form
s =( 1− y)
µ
1+y
β (χ − φ)
1
2 (R − r)σ2 γ
¶
. (35)
We refer to the pair of equations (33-34) as the one-dimensional Bellman equation of
the Proposer.
Proof. Rearranging (32), we obtain
β
γσ 2 (χ − φ)=m a x
z∈R
½
(R − r)z − 1
2
µ








The maximum is attained when the control variable
z =
R − r




and the maximum is
1
2 (R − r)2
(1 − y)R + yr−
y (1−y)γ0
γ
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Hence
β
γσ 2(χ − φ)=
1
2 (R − r)2




In particular, since R 6= r and (1 − y)R + yr−
y (1−y)γ0
γ > 0,w eh a v eχ − φ>0.
Now, rearranging (38) yields (33). Rearranging (38) also yields





2 (R − r)2 σ2 γ
β (χ − φ)
.
Substituting for the denominator of the RHS of (37) therefore gives
z =
β (χ − φ)
1
2 (R − r)σ2 γ
.
Hence, noting that s =( 1−y)(1+yz), we obtain (35). Finally, (34) is the same as (30).
One simple but important implication of the expression (31) for the Proposer’s objec-
tive is that: if R>r , then we will have z>0 for all y ∈ [0,1] (i.e. the Responder takes
on more than his autarky share of the risk); and, if R<r ,t h e nw ew i l lh a v ez<0 for
all y ∈ [0,1] (i.e. the Responder takes on less than his autarky share of the risk). We
formalize this observation in the following Corollary.
Corollary 17.
1. If R>rthen s>1 − y for all y ∈ (0,1).
2. If R<rthen s<1 − y for all y ∈ (0,1). ¥
The proof of Proposition 16 also establishes that the normalized gain from sharing in-
vestment risk is strictly positive. Combining this with the fact that φ(y,γ) ≥ Φ(0,y,γ)=
0, we obtain a second Corollary:
Corollary 18. Suppose that R 6= r.T h e nχ>φ≥ 0. ¥
Notice that φ =0iﬀ g =0 . Moreover, on the basis of the asymptotic expansions given
in Section 10 above, we would expect that g will indeed take the value 0 for some choices
of the parameter values.22 This is conﬁrmed by Figure 7 below.
22Speciﬁcally, it would be expected to happen for intermediate values of the ratio
2μ
σ2 .The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 45
11.3. Revisiting the General Formula for s. The changes of variable made in this










































































γ > 0, then there are two eﬀects. First, the endogenous risk aversion −
VPP
VP
of the Proposer is lower than her exogenous risk aversion −U00
U0 . Second, the elasticity −
VwP
VP
of the shadow value of transfers VP with respect to changes in the Responder’s wealth w is
strictly positive. The ﬁrst eﬀect tends to lower the Responder’s share in investment risk:
the Proposer can aﬀord to take on more risk because, if she receives a negative shock,
then this is partially oﬀset by a reduction in the opportunity cost of obtaining insurance;
and, if she receives a positive shock, then this is partially oﬀset by an increase in the
opportunity cost of obtaining insurance. The second eﬀect tends to raise the Responder’s
share in investment risk: obtaining more insurance from the Responder tends to increase
the Responder’s wealth, and increasing the Responder’s wealth decreases the Proposer’s
opportunity cost of obtaining insurance.
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γ > 0. Hence:
Proposition 19. Suppose that R>r .T h e ns − s(0) > 0 iﬀ γ0 > 0. ¥
In other words, the Responder takes on more risk under the optimal risk-sharing
rule than he would under the myopic benchmark iﬀ the shadow value of transfers γ is
decreasing in the Responder’s share in total wealth.
12. The Case of Large Wealth
One of the advantages of the one-dimensional Bellman equation derived in the previous
section is that it allows us to investigate what happens when the wealth of one party
becomes very large relative to the wealth of the other. We can understand what happens
when w →∞by examining the limit of the solution of the one-dimensional Bellman
equation as y → 0, and what happens when W →∞by examining the limit of the
solution of the one-dimensional Bellman equation as y → 1. In this section, we formulate
suﬃcient conditions under which the relevant limits exist. These conditions are also
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an optimal constract.
It is natural to begin by requiring that both parties have ﬁnite payoﬀsu n d e ra u t a r k y .
Indeed, from a risk-sharing perspective, the Responder is eﬀectively on his own when
y =0 ,a n dt h eP r o p o s e ri se ﬀectively on her own when y =1 .T h i si sw h a tC o n d i t i o n s
I and II ensure. However, when y ∈ (0,1), there is a gain from risk sharing. Moreover,
when normalized with respect to the wealth of the Responder, this gain will be largest
when y =1 ; and, when normalized for the wealth of the Proposer, it will be largest when
y =0 . In order to ensure that the normalized gain from risk sharing does not become
inﬁnite, it therefore suﬃces to ensure that it is ﬁnite when y =1and y =0 .
Putting y =1in equation (33) and rearranging yields
χ(1) − φ(1,γ(1)) =
1
2 (R − r)2 σ2
rβ
γ(1). (40)
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r(1 + g(1)) = 1, (43)
and equation (42) itself becomes











1+( 1− r)Cr(1 + g(1))
¶






r(1 + g(1)) − (1 − r)g(1)
=( 1 + g(1)) − (1 − r)g(1)
=1 + rg(1). (44)
N e x t ,n o t et h a tt h et h r e ee q u a t i o n s( 4 0 ) ,( 4 1 )a n d( 4 4 )a r el i n e a ri nt h et h r e eu n k n o w n s
χ(1), φ(1,γ(1)) and g(1). Solving them yields
r
γ(1)
(1 + g(1)) =
1
γr










Now, 1+g(1) must be in the domain of the function Cr,i . e .w em u s th a v e1+g(1) > 0.





βr and βr = β − (1 − r)(μ − 1
2 rσ 2), and rearranging, shows that this is
t h ec a s ei ﬀ:
Condition III. β>(1 − r)
³
μ − 1






The best way to understand Condition III is to compare it with Condition I. Condition
I requires that the rate of discounting β must exceed the rate of growth of the Responder’s
utility when his wealth grows at the risk-adjusted rate of return μ − 1
2 rσ 2,w h e r e a s
Condition III requires that the rate of discounting β must exceed the rate of growth of
utility when wealth grows at the higher rate μ− 1
2 rσ 2+ 1
2
(R−r)2σ2
r +βR. The latter rate is
composed of three terms: the certainty-equivalent rate of return derived from investment,The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 48
namely μ− 1




r , and the certainty-equivalent rate of return deriving from sharing
termination risk, namely βR.23 Moreover Condition II requires precisely that βR > 0.
Hence, assuming that Condition II holds, Condition III is stronger than Condition I when
r<1: the Responder’s utility function is unbounded above, and his certainty-equivalent
rate of return is larger, so we need more discounting if his expected payoﬀ is to be ﬁnite.
Similarly, again assuming that Condition II holds, Condition I is stronger than Condition
III when r>1: the Responder’s utility function is unbounded below, and his certainty-
equivalent rate of return is larger, so we now need less discounting than before in order
to ensure that his expected payoﬀ is ﬁnite.
We also need the corresponding condition derived from the case y =0 . Proceeding
analogously to the case y =1 , we obtain the four equations
χ(0) − φ(0,γ(0)) =
1
2 (R − r)2 σ2
Rβ
γ(0), (46)














Now, if R 6=1 , then we can solve the three equations (46), (47) and (49) for the three
unknowns χ(0), φ(0,γ(0)) and g(0).D o i n gs oy i e l d s
R
γr
(1 − g(0)) =
1
γR










23According to Proposition 9, the investment return on the Responder’s wealth and the monetary value
of the gains from sharing investment risk are
(μ − 1
2 rσ 2)w and 1
2





Normalizing these expressions with respect to the Responder’s wealth, i.e. dividing through by w, yields
μ − 1
2 rσ 2 and 1
2
(R − r)2 σ2 y
(1 − y)R + yr
.
Putting y =1then yields the ﬁrst two expressions in the text.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 49
Similarly, if R =1 , then one can solve the two equations (47) and (48) for the two





βr and βR = β −(1−R)(μ− 1
2 Rσ 2) in (50) and rearranging, we
ﬁnd that 1 − g(0) > 0 iﬀ
Condition IV. β>(1 − R)
³
μ − 1






Condition IV is completely analogous to Condition III. In particular, assuming that
Condition I holds, Condition IV is stronger than Condition II when R<1, and Condition
II is stronger than Condition IV when R>1. Furthermore, it can be shown that, in the
case in which both R<1 and r<1, Conditions III and IV together imply Conditions I
and II. The discussion of the present section can therefore be summarized as follows.
Proposition 20. As u ﬃcient condition for the one-dimensional Bellman equation of the
Proposer, namely (33-34), to have a solution that is continuous on [0,1] is that both of


































if r ≥ 1
)
.
In particular, these conditions are suﬃcient for the existence of an optimal contract. ¥
Remark 21. If one is interested primarily in the original problem, in which W>0 and
w>0, but not in the extended problem, in which the solution of the one-dimensional
Bellman equation of the Proposer is required to be continuous right up to the boundary,
then Conditions I and II should probably still be regarded as minimal conditions: they
ensure that the outside options of both parties are well deﬁned. However, it may be
possible to weaken Conditions III and IV: if the Proposer’s normalized value diverges as
y → 0,t h e nt h i sm a yb eo ﬀset by the fact that her wealth W → 0; and, if the Responder’s
normalized value diverges as y → 1,t h e nt h i sm a yb eo ﬀset by the fact that his wealth
w → 0. Investigating this possibility is, however, beyond the scope of the current paper.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 50
13. Numerical Solutions
In this section we solve the system (33-34) numerically, and use these solutions to compute
the optimal contract. The numerical solutions are obtained using the MatLab program
bvp4c.
The most striking feature of the numerical solutions is the degree to which they con-
form to the predictions of the asymptotic expansions. The ﬁrst prediction is quantitative:
there should be three main cases, namely the risk-tolerant case (2 >R>r ), the risk-
averse case (R>r>2) and the mixed case (R>2 >r ). The second set of predictions
is qualitative:
1. in the risk-tolerant case, we should have s − s(0) < 0 for all y;
2. in the risk-averse case, we should have s − s(0) > 0 for all y;
3. in the mixed case we should have s − s(0) > 0 for low y and s − s(0) < 0 for high y.
The third set of predictions is again quantitative. Putting B(0) = 2r− r
R, B(1) = R+r−R
r
and B = 1
4 r(4 + R):
1. in the risk-tolerant case, we should have b>0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 <B (1); b>0 for low
y and b<0 for high y if
2μ
σ2 ∈ (B(1),B(0)); b<0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 >B (0).
2. in the risk-averse case, we should have b>0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 <B (0); b<0 for low y
and b>0 for high y if
2μ
σ2 ∈ (B(0),B(1)); b<0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 >B (1).
3. in the mixed case we should have b>0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 < min{B(0),B(1)}; b<0 for







b<0 for all y if
2μ
σ2 > B.24
These predictions are borne out by all the simulations presented here and by numerous
unreported simulations. Moreover it seems likely that the ﬁrst prediction and the second
set of predictions taken together are in fact a theorem.
24We omit the subcase in which
2μ
σ2 ∈ (min{B(0),B(1)},max{B(0),B(1)}) since it divides into two
subsubcases depending on whether B(0) <B (1) or B(0) >B (1).The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 51
In this section we shall focus mainly on three baseline parameter constellations:
Case R r μ σ β
Risk-Tolerant 1 0.5 0.025 0.15 0.05
Risk-Averse 10 2.5 0.12 0.15 0.05
Mixed 8 1.3 0.10 0.15 0.05
In all three cases: σ =0 .15, which is in line with estimates of the volatility of the US
stock market: and β =0 .05, which is loosely calibrated on estimates of subjective discount
rates. The coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion R and r are then chosen – from within the
range that has been found in empirical studies – to balance two competing objectives:
on the one hand, we do not want the dynamic eﬀects to be swamped by the myopic
eﬀects; but, on the other, we want our simulations to be completely stable.25 The ﬁnal
parameter μ is then chosen in such a way that Conditions I-IV are satisﬁed. For example,
in the risk-tolerant case, the cost of risk is low and μ must not be too large; and, in the
r i s k - a v e r s ec a s e ,t h ec o s to fr i s ki sh i g ha n dμ must not be too small.
For such a small value of β, we cannot expect our asymptotic expansions – which are
based on the assumption that β is large – to be quantitatively accurate in all respects.26
However, as we shall see, the qualitative predictions – and some of the quantitative
predictions – obtained from these expansions are remarkably accurate even though the
β we actually use is rather small.
We begin by noting that s(0)
1−y is the fraction of the investment risk on his own wealth
that the Responder bears under the myopic contract (and s(0)
1−y−1 is his leverage). Similarly,
s
1−y is the fraction of the investment risk on his own wealth that he bears under the optimal
contract (and s
1−y −1 is his leverage). Figure 4 plots s(0)
1−y and s
1−y as a function of y in the
three baseline cases. In all cases, both s(0)
1−y and s
1−y increase from 1 to R
r as y increases
from 0 to 1.T h e y t a k e t h e v a l u e 1 when y =0 , because in that case the Responder
has all the wealth, and so risk sharing with the Proposer has a negligible impact on his
leverage. They are increasing in y because – from the point of view of the Responder
– the opportunities for risk sharing are increasing in y and, as the less risk averse party,
taking advantage of these opportunites means increasing his leverage. Notice that the
leverage of the Responder can be quite substantial when y =1 : in the risk-tolerant case
25For examples of such studies, see Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), Guiso and Paiella
(2008), Chiappori and Paiella (2008) and Paravisini, Rappoport and Ravina (2009).
26For further discussion of the magnitude of β, see footnote 17 above.The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 52
he is 100% levered when y =1 ; in the risk-averse case he is 300% l e v e r e d ;a n di nt h e
m i x e dc a s eh ei sa b o u t515% levered.
Figure 4 about here
The relationship between s(0)
1−y and s




1−y: in the risk-tolerant case, the Responder takes on less risk than he would under the
myopic benchmark, i.e. s
1−y < s(0)
1−y; in the risk-averse case, the Responder takes on more
risk than he would under the myopic benchmark, i.e. s
1−y > s(0)
1−y; and, in the mixed case,
the Responder takes on more risk when his wealth is high and less risk when his wealth
is low, i.e. s
1−y > s(0)
1−y when y is low and s
1−y < s(0)
1−y when y is high.
T h es i z eo ft h ed i ﬀerence s
1−y− s(0)
1−y between the Responder’s leverage under the optimal
contract and his leverage under the myopic benchmark can be seen more clearly in Figure
5. In the risk-tolerant case, this diﬀerence troughs for y around 0.92,w i t hav a l u eo fa b o u t
−0.07. At this point the myopic benchmark is around 1.85, so the diﬀerence is about
−3.7% of the benchmark. A somewhat larger eﬀect (reﬂecting the greater diﬀerence in
risk aversion) is obtained for the risk-averse case: the diﬀerence peaks for y around 0.79,
with a value of about 0.13. A tt h i sp o i n tt h em y o p i cb e n c h m a r ki sa r o u n d2.44,s ot h e
diﬀerence is about 5.5% of the benchmark. The largest eﬀects are obtained for the mixed
case. In this case, the diﬀerence ﬁrst peaks for y around 0.70, with a value of about 0.21,
a n dt h e nt r o u g h sf o ry around 0.98, with a value of about −0.38. So, in the mixed case,
the extreme diﬀerences are about 8.7% and −6.7% of the benchmark respectively.
Figure 5 about here
Next, b
1−y is the fraction of the Responder’s wealth that the Proposer pays to the
Responder on termination. Figure 6 shows that, in all three of our baseline cases, this
fraction is 0 when y =0and decreases as y increases from 0 to 1.I t i s z e r o a t y =0
because the Responder has all the wealth, and any payment from the Proposer to the
Responder is therefore negligible relative to the Responder’s wealth. It is negative for
y>0 because the investment opportunity is valuable, and it is therefore the Responder
who compensates the Proposer when it terminates. What is perhaps most striking is the
sheer size of the payments made by the Responder: in the risk-tolerant case, he pays out























































Figure 5HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case Hwith R = 1, r = 0.5, m = 0.025, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L









Figure 5HbL: the Risk-Averse Case Hwith R = 10, r = 2.5, m = 0.12, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L








Figure 5HcL: the Mixed Case Hwith R = 8, r = 1.3, m = 0.10, s = 0.15, b = 0.05LThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 53
and in the mixed case, he pays out almost 94%.27 The magnitude of these payments
underlines the importance of sharing termination risk.
Figure 6 about here
Finally, the asymptotic expansions for b
1−y suggest that it will not always be the case
that b
1−y < 0 or that b
1−y is decreasing. In fact, those expansions make a number of
predictions to which we turn in our ﬁnal ﬁgure. For example, in the risk-tolerant case,
we have 1
2 σ2 B(0) ≈ 0.0056 and 1
2 σ2 B(1) ≈− 0.0056. Hence, assuming that we keep
σ =0 .15,w ee x p e c tt oh a v e :
1. b
1−y > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ<−0.0056;
2. b
1−y > 0 for low y and b
1−y < 0 for high y iﬀ μ ∈ (−0.0056,0.0056);
3. b
1−y < 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ>0.0056.
Figure 7(a), which plots b
1−y for μ ∈ {−0.01,0,0.01}, is consistent with these predictions.
In the risk-averse case, we have 1
2 σ2 B(0) ≈ 0.053 and 1
2 σ2 B(1) ≈ 0.096. Hence we
expect to have:
1. b
1−y > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ<0.053;
2. b
1−y > 0 for low y and b
1−y < 0 for high y iﬀ μ ∈ (0.053,0.096);
3. b
1−y < 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ>0.096.
Figure 7(b), which plots b
1−y for μ ∈ {0.03,0.08,0.12}, is consistent with these predictions.
(In this ﬁgure, β has to be chosen appropriately in order to ensure that Conditions I-IV
are satisﬁed.)
In the mixed case, we have 1
2 σ2 B(0) ≈ 0.027, 1
2 σ2 B(1) ≈ 0.035 and 1
2 σ2 max{B(y) |
y ∈ [0,1]} ≈ 0.044. Hence we expect to have:
27If we multiply equations (43) and (45) together and rearrange, then we obtain




βr − βP − 1
2




This equation can then be inverted to yield an explicit formula for g(1). The numerical solutions for b
1−y
at y =1are in excellent agreement with this formula.Figure 6: the optimal termination payment
b
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Figure 6HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case Hwith R = 1, r = 0.5, m = 0.025, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L







Figure 6HbL: the Risk-Averse Case Hwith R = 10, r = 2.5, m = 0.12, s = 0.15, b = 0.05L






Figure 6HcL: the Mixed Case Hwith R = 8, r = 1.3, m = 0.10, s = 0.15, b = 0.05LThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 54
1. b
1−y > 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ<0.027;
2. b
1−y < 0 for low y, b
1−y > 0 for intermediate y and b
1−y < 0 for high y iﬀ μ ∈
(0.035,0.044);
3. b
1−y < 0 for all y ∈ (0,1) iﬀ μ>0.044.
Figure 7(c), which plots b
1−y for μ ∈ {0.02,0.04,0.05}, is consistent with these predictions.
(In this ﬁgure, β must again be chosen appropriately in order to ensure that Conditions
I-IV are satisﬁed.)
Figure 7 about here
What is remarkable about Figure 7 is the way in which the asymptotic expansions give
a detailed guide as to what patterns to expect, and precise suggestions for the parameter
values that will give rise to those patterns.
14. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed an optimal risk-sharing problem in which two parties invest
in a common constant-returns-to-scale risky asset. The two parties have diﬀerent coeﬃ-
cients of relative risk aversion, and they start with diﬀerent wealth endowments. We have
taken out many interesting features from the model to keep the analysis tractable. In par-
ticular, we have only allowed for consumption at the end, and we have only considered an
extreme bargaining situation in which one of the parties can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
to the other. Within this model we have, however, been able to push the characterization
of optimal risk-sharing quite far.
For example, we have used asymptotic expansions to obtain approximations to the
optimal risk-sharing rules. These approximations capture in a transparent way the main
tradeoﬀs that the contracting parties face. Moreover numerical simulations conﬁrm that
the picture that they generate is qualitatively (and sometimes quantitatively) accurate.
The approximations can be decomposed into a myopic benchmark and a dynamic
correction. In the case of the optimal rule s for the Responder’s share in investment risk,
the myopic benchmark s(0) is the classical ratio of the Proposer’s absolute risk aversion






,Figure 7: the optimal termination payment
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m = 0 and b = 0.05
m = 0.01 and b = 0.05






Figure 7HaL: the Risk-Tolerant Case with R = 1, r = 0.5, s = 0.15,
m = 0.03 and b = 0.8
m = 0.08 and b = 0.4
m = 0.12 and b = 0.02








Figure 7HbL: the Risk-Averse Case with R = 10, r = 2.5, s = 0.15,
m = 0.02 and b = 0.55
m = 0.04 and b = 0.4
m = 0.05 and b = 0.35








Figure 7HcL: the Mixed Case with R = 8, r = 1.3, s = 0.15,The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 55
where R and r are the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion of the Proposer and the Re-
sponder, and W and w are their wealths. This formula captures the basic aspects of
risk sharing. For example, the wealthier or the less risk averse the Proposer, the less the
investment risk taken on by the Responder.
The myopic benchmark does not, however, capture counterparty risk. For example,
if the Responder is risk neutral (i.e. if r =0 ), then it predicts that the Responder will
take on all the investment risk. However, if the Responder took on all the investment
risk, then he would run out of wealth in ﬁnite time. The Proposer would thereafter not
be able to obtain any insurance. In other words, the Responder’s insurance capacity is
ﬁnite, and the Proposer should take this into account by adjusting the risk-sharing rule
to conserve it as it begins to run low.
These ideas are captured by the dynamic correction 1
β s(1), which can be written in
the form
1
2 Rrσ 2 y2 (1 − y)2
β ((1 − y)R + yr)5 (R − r)
3 ((1 − y)R + yr− 2),
where β is the hazard rate of termination, σ is the volatility of investment returns and
y = W
W+w is the Proposer’s share in total wealth. This formula for the dynamic correction
is the product of three terms. The ﬁrst is always positive, so the sign of the dynamic
correction is determined by two considerations: whether the Proposer is more risk averse
than the Responder, in the sense that R>r ; and whether the average risk aversion of
the two parties is large, in the sense that (1 −y)R +yr>2.( A se a c hp a r t y ’ sc o e ﬃcient
of relative risk aversion is weighted by the other party’s share in total wealth, it is the
risk aversion of the poorer party that matters most in this inequality.)
The three key predictions from this formula for the dynamic correction are then as
follows. First, if both investors are fairly risk tolerant (in the sense that R,r < 2), then
the investor who is more risk averse takes on a larger share of total investment risk than
she would under the myopic benchmark. Indeed, the investor who is less risk averse is
willing to take on risk on relatively unfavourable t e r m s .S ot h em o r er i s kh et a k e so n ,t h e
sooner he will run out of wealth. The optimal dynamic contract therefore transfers less
risk to him than the optimal myopic contract.
Second, if both investors are fairly risk averse (in the sense that R,r > 2), then the
investor who is more risk averse takes on a smaller share of total investment risk than
she would under the myopic benchmark. This is because the investor who is less risk
averse is only willing to take on risk on relatively favourable terms. So taking on moreThe Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing 56
risk actually delays the time at which he will run out of wealth. The optimal dynamic
contract therefore transfers more risk to him than the optimal myopic contract.
Third, if one investor is fairly risk averse and the other is fairly risk tolerant (in the
sense that R>2 >ror r>2 >R ), then the investor who is more risk averse takes on a
smaller share of total investment risk when her wealth is small and a larger share when
her wealth is large. This is because, while she would like to reduce the amount of risk
transferred to her risk-tolerant counterparty, the cost of bearing the extra risk herself is
too high when her wealth is low.
In sum, the approximations to the optimal risk-sharing rule s we have derived capture
in a relatively simple way the tradeoﬀ between getting more insurance coverage today and
preserving future insurance options. Moreover, these rules are explicit and easy to apply.
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